The Bofors scandal, uncovered by journalist Chitra Subramaniam in 1987, revealed a $1.3 billion corruption scheme in India’s purchase of Swedish howitzers, setting a benchmark for investigative journalism
Prof Satya Narayan Misra
The story of Bofors took to wings on 16th April 1987, when the Bofors pay-off story hit the Swedish radio, and a 29-year-old Chitra Subramaniam, a stringer, and would-be mother, based in Switzerland, decided to follow it up. Little knowing that it would consume her life for a decade, as she had to balance motherhood and journalism, with the former often taking a backseat. She developed a network of shadowy whistle-blowers, unearthed a demining paper trail, and uncovered a $1.3 billion scandal.
Thirty years later she has just published ‘Bofors Gate’, which is more than a courageous memoir. It’s a testament to her unceasing tenacity, strong ethical underpinning, and the courage to speak truth to power. It is a remarkable saga, which should be a template for investigative journalism.
Scandal’s Contours
The contract for purchasing 410 pieces of 39-caliber FH 77B Howitzers with a range of 30 km was signed on 31st March 1986 for $1.4 billion, which was to be followed by licensed production in India. A year later, the Swedish radio brought out how approximately Rs 60 cr was paid to AE Services as an agency commission, which was passed on as secret deposits into accounts of shady middlemen like Quattarochhi, with a deep connection with Sonia & the Gandhi family.
Chitra writes “I often get asked about the direct involvement of the Gandhi family in the corruption. I say, I do not know. What I do know is that Bofors paid Quattrochhi some $7 million.” This was proved when on 1st May 2009, a bank account in London was unfrozen to allow Q to retrieve his money. Not only did he touch his money swiftly, but he also had it transferred leaving a money trail.
Dramatis Personae
While most of the shady operations and persons involved are in public knowledge, Chitra, the peripatetic and intrepid crusader to unearth the truth, brings out interesting insights, particularly regarding the role played by General Sunderji, the then Army Chief, the inexplicable silence of Arun Singh, the Minister of State for Defense, the indecent hurry shown by Mr. Bhatnagar, the then Defence Secretary to clinch the deal and courage of conviction displayed by Mr. TN Chaturvedi, the then C&AG.
In an interview with Chitra in 1989 General Sunderji mentioned that he sincerely believed that the Swedish gun had an edge over the French gun because of its ‘shoot and scoot’ capacity. More damningly he observed that the AHQ between the years 1983, 1984 & 1985 had ‘in my view, deliberately with malafide intentions, weighed the French gun unduly, turning it into a one-horse race. It was so evident for everybody to see it and was objective enough.’ He was of the view that ‘changing the inter se priority between guns is not a serious crime, given that the factors which go into final choice are fundamentally finance and political reliability.’
Arun Singh believed it was a massive cover-up plan to obfuscate the issue, ‘just to save the skin of one man’. Who the man was, was never shared by him. It seems that his children were under threat, as he confided to Gen Sunderji in 1990. It sounds so ghastly, but in the murky world of politics, pelf, and power, nothing seems improbable. He had serious differences with Rajiv when he did not want to get a confession from Bofors regarding the alleged payoff.
He was also deeply hurt when Rajiv offered him any lucrative diplomatic assignment he wanted. It was like doing business with a buddy. Arun hibernated in the hills of Almora till Jaswant Singh as Defense Minister called him to join him as an Advisor in 1999.
The special judge Prem Kumar of CBI who grilled Mr Bhatnagar, the then Defence Secretary for several hours concluded that serious irregularities in procedure were adopted by the Contract Negotiating team headed by Mr. Bhatnagar. While the offer of Bofors was cheaper on 21st March 1986, Sofma had offered a further reduction on the very same day which was not considered.
Bofors gave a verbal assurance that 10 guns would be supplied free of cost. A similar opportunity was not given to Sofma, whose credit offer was cheaper and its Net Present Value was lower as of 21st March 1986. The contract was signed by all concerned on 31st March, showing that the Bofors Gun System was superior and available at a much cheaper price.
On the contrary, Chitra has the highest praise for Mr. TN Chaturvedi, the then C&AG who questioned both the technical and cost assessment of the Bofors’ offer, thus blowing a hole in the government and JPC’s assertion that the best possible gun was purchased for the lowest possible price. The AHQ indicated on six occasions (1982-86) that their preference was for the Sofma gun system.
However, it reversed its preference in February 1986 and recommended Bofors, at the behest of Army Chief Sunderji’s recommendation. It found the cost of the systems flawed. Ammunition worth Rs 328 cr was ordered after diluting the minimum acceptable parameters. Maintenance costs were not assessed as well as the cost of obtaining technology for license production to make a realistic comparison of the two offers. Mr Chaturvedi lost a bit of his moral heights when he joined the BJP in 1991 and became an MP in the Rajya Sabha.
Kargil & Aftermath
Ironically the Bofors guns came in very handy and effective during the Kargil operations in 1999. With its 30 km range and ability to fire at 90 degrees with deadly lethality, they were largely responsible for repulsing the Pakistani intruders who were strongly entrenched inside bunkers on the Kargil hills. General Sunderji’s assessment of its ‘shoot and scoot’ facility could decimate the artillery batteries of Pakistan.
While the technical documents for Indigenous production of 155 mm guns were lying in the cans, lest it may resuscitate the ghost of Bofors, the Modi government has allowed the Ordnance Factory Board to use them for producing an indigenous 155 mm, 45 caliber guns under the aegis of Project Dhanush. Make in India has got a real kickstart in the area of long-range artillery guns, after hibernating for three decades.
Post Script
The boxes with the secret bank documents received from Switzerland remain unopened in the CBI office in New Delhi. They contain the self-respect of India. It’s unlikely to be opened by the BJP as the clean image of Rajiv has been sufficiently besmirched by the Bofors scandal and of the Congress by the subsequent 2G, Coal gate scam during UPA II’s tenure.
Chitra writes that journalism is a public good, but above that, it is as much about keeping faith alive. It is about hope from not slipping into cynicism. She also believes that the false closure of corruption bleeds the system and silence is not the answer. Investigative journalism needs ethics, principle & tenacity, and the courage to speak truth to power.
In these highly divisive times, Bofors Gate is a timely alarm bell to most of the mainstream media who seem to kowtow the party in power. Noam Chomsky’s pioneering book ‘Manufacturing Consent’ brings out how the American Media performed a Supportive Propaganda Function in the 80s.
It has a disturbing resonance with the mainstream media in India. Chitra writes that she was never enamored of power, pelf, or politics. She does not spare her editor, N Ram of Hindu who could be overbearing and a bully. She has also not been comfortable with Mr. Ram’s hobnobbing with the Hinduja brothers, who were prime suspects in the shady deals of Bofors. Like Nirad Chaudhuri, she could be a gadfly in calling a spade a spade.
(The writer is a Professor Emeritus, KiiT University, Bhubaneswar. Views expressed are personal.)
