A recent Supreme Court verdict on delayed bill assent has reignited debate over the Governor’s role in India’s federal setup
Tejeswar Patnaik
The role of the Governor in India’s federal structure has once again come under the spotlight, following the recent landmark verdict of the Supreme Court on the issue of withholding assent to bills passed by state legislatures. In a judgment with far-reaching implications for Centre-State relations, the apex court addressed the Governor’s action of indefinitely withholding bills passed by democratically elected state governments. The Court’s ruling significantly reaffirms constitutional propriety and democratic norms.
The Supreme Court disapproved of the prolonged inaction by the Governor, which had effectively stalled the legislative process in the concerned state. By clearing ten such pending bills, the Court reinforced the authority of state legislatures and upheld their primacy in a democratic setup. The ruling sends a clear message: Governors must act following constitutional obligations and not impede the democratic will of the people. Further, any indefinite delay on the part of the Governor in withholding bills may also likely affect the development of the state.
According to Article 200 of the Indian Constitution, the Governor must either give assent to a bill, withhold it, return it (if it is not a money bill), or reserve it for the President’s consideration. While the Article does not provide a specific time frame for action, the Court addressed this ambiguity by stipulating that the Governor should take appropriate action within three months. This directive is expected to prevent misuse of gubernatorial discretion and ensure timely legislative processing.
This verdict is particularly relevant in the current political landscape, where there has been growing friction between Governors and opposition-ruled state governments in states like Kerala, West Bengal, Telangana, Punjab, and Tamil Nadu. Disagreements over bill assent, legislative procedures, and administrative decisions have frequently escalated into public controversies, raising questions about the neutrality and conduct of Governors.
Additionally, the Governor’s authority under Article 356 to recommend President’s Rule in a state has often been perceived as a political tool. Historically, this provision has been misused, especially during the Congress regime, to dismiss opposition-ruled state governments. Such interventions, while sometimes necessary, have more often than not undermined democratic principles and damaged the federal fabric of the nation.
Debates around the Governor’s role are not new. During the Constituent Assembly debates, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar firmly rejected the idea of Governors being elected by state legislatures. He asserted that the Governor is primarily a constitutional head with no real executive power and cautioned that an elected Governor might push for excessive provincial autonomy, thus affecting the unity of the Indian Union.
However, the current state of affairs compels us to revisit Ambedkar’s vision. Why should an appointee of the Centre, often selected on political considerations, be vested with discretionary powers that can override the mandate of a democratically elected state government? In recent years, there has been an increasing erosion of constitutional provisions, constitutional morality, and the spirit of cooperative federalism. The conduct of some Governors has raised serious concerns and has, at times, appeared to violate the very Constitution they are sworn to uphold.
The Governor occupies a unique position in India’s constitutional framework, serving as a bridge between the Centre and the States. Despite being a ceremonial head, the Governor has more discretionary powers than even the President of India. These powers become particularly significant in situations like a hung assembly or a constitutional crisis.
The appointment process itself has drawn criticism. More often than not, retired politicians or bureaucrats with affiliations to the ruling party at the Centre are appointed as Governors. This practice has led to questions about impartiality and has sparked demands for reform. Critics argue that such appointments undermine the intent of the Constitution, which envisions a neutral and dignified office capable of maintaining the constitutional balance between the Centre and States.
Adding to the complexity is the lack of clarity in constitutional provisions regarding the Governor’s discretionary powers. For example, during a hung assembly, the Governor’s role in inviting a party to form the government can be influenced by subjective interpretations. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court in the S.R. Bommai case (1994) outlined circumstances under which a breakdown of constitutional machinery could be legitimately claimed, such as political instability, internal subversion, or a failure to uphold constitutional norms.
Another key ruling, in Nabam Rebia & Others vs Deputy Speaker of Arunachal Pradesh (2016), further curtailed the Governor’s discretionary power. The Court emphasized that Article 163 does not grant absolute discretion to the Governor and that he or she must act with the advice of the Council of Ministers. The Court also held that the Governor’s decisions on summoning, proroguing, or dissolving the state assembly are subject to judicial review, setting a vital precedent for accountability.
In response to recurring controversies, the Punchhi Commission was established in 2007 to study Centre-State relations and suggest reforms. The Commission made significant recommendations regarding the role and appointment of Governors: The candidate for the Governorship should have no active political affiliation for at least two years before appointment.
A selection committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha, and the Chief Minister of the concerned state should select the Governor. State legislatures should be empowered to pass resolutions seeking the removal of a Governor in case of constitutional impropriety. Unfortunately, these progressive suggestions are yet to be accepted by the Central Government.
It is now imperative for the Central Government to seriously consider the Punchhi Commission’s recommendations. The recent verdict of the division bench of the Supreme Court on the Tamil Nadu Governor’s conduct in withholding the bills is a stark reminder of the need to maintain healthy Centre-State relations. Implementing the Punchhi Commission’s reforms will help ensure that Governors act as impartial custodians of the Constitution, rather than political emissaries. More particularly, it will restore faith in the federal structure and reinforce the principles of democracy and cooperative governance.
Striking a balance between the Centre’s power to appoint Governors and the States’ right to autonomous functioning is essential, considering India‘s diversity. Only by preserving the neutrality of the Governor’s office can our nation truly uphold the spirit of cooperative federalism and ensure harmony within its diverse and vibrant polity.
(The writer is a former Dy General Manager of Bank of India. Views expressed are personal.)
